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PROTECTING SURVIVORS OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WITHIN THE 
INSURANCE REGIME: OPPORTUNITIES 
TO SEEK TERMINATION OR VARIATION 




Abstract: A person whose life is insured under a life insurance 
contract for the benefit of another person does not have a 
contractual or common law right to terminate or otherwise 
affect the terms of the contract. As well, such contracts remain 
valid even after termination of the relationship that provided 
an insurable interest at the commencement of the contract. The 
existence of a life insurance contract might provide an 
incentive for the policy owner/beneficiary to cause harm to the 
insured person in order to collect the insurance money. 
Recovery of the insurance money is precluded on grounds of 
public policy if the beneficiary is found liable for the death of 
the insured person. However, this is no comfort for the victim; 
indeed, this situation has the potential to create or exacerbate 
the vulnerability of victims of domestic violence, who are 
mostly women and children. Manitoba, British Columbia and 
Alberta have enacted provisions entitling persons whose lives 
are insured to seek judicial remedies aimed at alleviating the 
safety concerns in specified circumstances, notwithstanding the 
applicant’s lack of privity of contract. This paper examines the 
bases and nature of the remedial options and explores how 
they can effectively protect persons whose lives are insured for 
the benefit of the policy owner and the appropriate threshold 
for granting remedies. Applicants may seek remedies under the 
insurance legislation in conjunction with protection orders in 
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the family or criminal context. Courts are likely to assess 
similar factors when considering appropriate remedies under 
the insurance and family law regimes. Although these remedies 
are not a panacea for domestic violence, they may be 
significant in preventing violence against women and children 
whose lives are insured by other family members and where the 
latter’s motivation for violence may include recovery of 




The insurer-insured relationship is inherently an unequal one. 
Consequently, an important goal of insurance regulation is to 
protect consumers of insurance products. However, the 
vulnerability that may arise in an insurance context is not 
limited to the insurer-insured relationship. Perpetrators of 
domestic violence can use the existence of an insurance policy 
as a “weapon” to terrorize their victims, who are most 
commonly women and children.1 A policy owner who is also 
the beneficiary under an insurance policy can hold a valid 
insurance contract on the life of another person with whom 
they may have a strained relationship. This is concerning in 
circumstances where there is potential for violence by the 
policy owner/beneficiary against the person whose life is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  The prevalence of domestic violence against women was highlighted 
in a 2013 World Health Organization report. According to the report, 
over 30 percent of women experience violence at the hands of an 
intimate partner, making it the most common type of abuse affecting 
women. As well, the report notes that 38 percent of all murdered 
women died at the hands of their partners. While there are regional 
variations in the prevalence of violence against women, the rate of 
abuse in high-income countries including Canada is 23.2 percent. 
WHO, Global and Regional Estimates of Violence against Women: 
Prevalence and Health Effects of Intimate Partner Violence and non-
Partner Sexual Violence (Geneva, 2013), online: 
<http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85239/1/9789241564625_e
ng.pdf>. 





insured.  The nature of life insurance contracts whereby the 
person whose life is insured is different from the beneficiary 
can create a temptation for the latter to cause the insured risk, 
that is, end the former’s life; this creates “a decidedly harmful 
tendency”.2 Concerns about the harmful tendency created by 
the opportunity to benefit from the death of the person whose 
life is insured are mitigated by the fact that there is often a 
relationship of love and affection between the 
owner/beneficiary and the life insured. The former is interested 
in the continuing existence of the latter. The force of that 
assumption may wane where there is a breakdown of the 
relationship of love and care and the beneficiary may no longer 
be interested in the continuing existence of the person whose 
life is insured and upon whose death they have an opportunity 
for financial gain.  
 
A person whose life is insured under a valid insurance 
contract for the benefit of another has no common law or 
contractual right to apply to the insurer for termination or 
variation of the terms of the insurance contract on her or his 
life. This position stems from the well-worn doctrine of privity 
of contract, whereby a third party to a contract is precluded 
from affecting the contract’s terms. The concern that the privity 
doctrine may be ill-suited to life insurance contracts was raised 
in the debate in the BC legislature leading to the enactment of 
the 2012 Insurance Act:  
 
Currently a life-insured individual who is not the 
policyholder cannot cancel the life insurance 
policy even though the policy owner may no 
longer have an insurable interest in that person's 
life. This situation may arise, for example, upon 
termination of employment or upon a divorce. 
The person whose life is insured may feel 
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2  Edwin W Patterson, “Insurable Interest in Life” (1918) Columbia L 
Rev, 381 at 389. 




uncomfortable or even at personal risk knowing 
that their death will benefit another individual.3 
 
Insurance legislation is beginning to address this 
concern. Recent amendments or enactments of insurance 
legislation in some Canadian jurisdictions aim to protect 
survivors of domestic violence and, more generally, insured 
persons upon the breakdown of relationships, and seek to 
neutralize the potential of an insurance policy to contribute to 
the systemic violence against women and children. Two 
specific legislative reforms stand out in this regard: (1) 
recovery by an innocent co-insured where an insured under the 
same policy intentionally causes loss or damage to the insured 
property;4 and (2) option for seeking a court order for 
termination or variation of the terms of an insurance contract 
where the person whose life is insured feels he or she could be 
at risk of harm at the hands of the owner/beneficiary of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3  British Columbia, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative 
Assembly (Hansard), 39th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 4, No 2 (6 October 
2009) at 987 (B. Ralston). 
4  Insurance Act, RSBC 2012, c 1, s 35 [BC Insurance Act]; see also 
Insurance Act, RSA 2000, c I-3, s 541 [Alberta Insurance Act]; 
Insurance Act, CCSM I40, s 136.5 [Manitoba Insurance Act]. This 
provision protects the interests of persons with joint ownership or 
interests in the same property, such as the family home, and their 
interests are insured under a single insurance policy with joint rights 
and obligations for co-insureds. Prior to the introduction of the 
provision protecting the interests of the innocent co-insured, such 
persons were vulnerable to the actions of their partners and 
cohabitants who cause damage or loss to the insured property because 
they were also precluded from recovering their interest in the insured 
property under the intentional/criminal  injury exclusion clause in 
insurance contracts. For a discussion of this provision, see E. Adjin-
Tettey, “Personal Responsibility for Intentional Conduct: Protecting 
the Interests of Innocent Co-Insured under Insurance Contracts” 
(2013) 50 Alta L Rev 615. 





insurance policy on her or his life,5 or where insurable interest 
ceases to exist.6 This paper will focus on the latter issue and 
examine the extent to which the termination and/or variation 
provisions offer protection to victims of domestic violence. 
 
The paper begins with a discussion of the rationale for 
termination or variation remedies in life, accident and sickness 
insurance contracts. This is followed by a discussion of the 
insurable interest requirement for non-indemnity insurance 
contracts, highlighting concerns about requiring an insurable 
interest only at the commencement of a contract but not at the 
time of loss. Next, the paper explains the need to protect 
persons whose lives are insured by others, especially in the 
domestic context where there may be the potential for violence. 
In such cases, the possibility of financial gain from collecting 
insurance money may reasonably be perceived as a motive for 
the policy owner/beneficiary to endanger the life or health of 
the person whose life is insured in order to bring about the 
insured loss. So far, Manitoba, Alberta and British Columbia 
have enacted provisions entitling persons whose lives are 
insured to seek judicial remedies in specified circumstances. 
Similar amendments have been introduced in Ontario but the 
provisions are yet to come into force. I examine the bases for 
and the available remedies, and suggest ways in which the 
provisions could offer better protections for persons whose 
lives are insured including the appropriate threshold for 
granting remedies.  
 
Terminating or Varying Insurance Contracts 
 
Currently in BC, Alberta and Manitoba, a person whose life is 
insured under a life or accident and sickness insurance policy, 
and who reasonably believes continuation of the insurance 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5  BC Insurance Act, ibid, ss 47 and 109; Alberta Insurance Act, ibid, ss 
648 and 717, Manitoba Insurance)Act,)ibid,!ss!155.1!and!217.2. 
6!Manitoba Insurance)Act,)ibid,)ss!155(4)!and!217.1.!




contract might endanger her or his life or health, can seek a 
court order to allay the concern about their health and well-
being.7  The court has the discretion to provide a remedy that it 
sees fit in the circumstances, which may include termination of 
the contract in accordance with its terms or variation of the 
terms of the contract such as reducing the insurance amount.  
This remedy is intended to eliminate, or at least reduce, the risk 
to the insured person’s life or health emanating from the policy 
owner/beneficiary holding an insurance contract on their life. 
The need for such a remedy typically arises in the domestic 
context where a family member might be concerned that the 
beneficiary of the policy, who is also likely to be the policy 
owner, could harm them to collect insurance money or could 
engineer the insured event for a variety of reasons including 
jealousy, acrimonious relationship breakdown, or as an act of 
violence.8  
 
A beneficiary is precluded from recovering the 
insurance money where he or she is found to be responsible for 
bringing about the insured loss, specifically for causing the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  BC Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 47 (life) and s 109 (accident and 
sickness). See also Alberta Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 648 (life), s 
717 (accident and sickness); Manitoba Insurance)Act,)supra)note!4,!s!
155.1!(life)!and!s!217.2!(accident and sickness);)Insurance Act, RSO 
1990, c I.8, ss 179.1 (life), 306.1 (accident and sickness) (not yet in 
force)[Ontario Insurance Act]. In Manitoba, there is also an option of 
seeking termination of an insurance contract upon cessation of 
insurable interest: Manitoba Insurance Act,, ss 155(4) and 217.1. 
8  Although the uneasiness about a person continuing to be the owner 
and beneficiary of an insurance policy after the termination of a 
relationship often arises in the domestic context, it can also arise in 
any of the other relationships that give rise to an insurable interest 
such as breakdown in an employment relationship as was in 
Chantiam v Packall Packaging Inc (1998), 38 OR (3d) 401, 159 DLR 
(4th) 517 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1998] SCCA 358 
[Chantiam]; and in partnerships as was in Hechter v Sonya (1999), 
131 Man R (2d) 295 (CA) [Hechter]. 





death of the person whose life is insured.9 However, this would 
be little comfort if the person whose life was insured had been 
killed. Although it may be difficult to draw a firm link between 
spousal murder and life insurance benefits, there are a 
multitude of cases in which such benefits have been cited as a 
possible factor in homicides.10 As well, there may not always 
be sufficient evidence to charge and prosecute the beneficiary, 
or to find him or her liable for causing the insured event on the 
criminal standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Additionally, the insurer may not have sufficient evidence to 
deny recovery of the insurance money based on the civil 
standard of balance of probabilities in a claim on the policy. In 
such cases, the beneficiary may still be able to benefit from the 
insurance contract even if a cloud of suspicion continues to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9  See Brissette Estate v Westbury Life Ins Co, [1992] 3 SCR 87; 
Papasotiriou-Lanteigne v Manufacturer's Life Insurance Co, 2012 
ONSC 6473 at para 14; Oldfield v Transamerica Life Insurance Co of 
Canada, 2002 SCC 22; Goulet v Transamerica Life Insurance Co of 
Canada, 2002 SCC 21; Demeter v Dominion Life Assurance 
Company (1982), 35 OR (2d) 560 (CA); Chan Estate (Public Trustee 
of) v Allstate Life Insurance Co. of Canada, 1998 ABQB 1031, 238 
AR 63 (QB). See also Erik Knutsen, “Fortuity Clauses in Liability 
Insurance: Solving Coverage Dilemma for Intentional and Criminal 
Conduct” (2011-12) 37 Queen’s LJ 73.  
10  For several illustrative examples of cases in which life insurance was 
thought to play a role in spousal homicide, see R v Toor, 2005 BCCA 
333 (husband took out life insurance on his new wife and murdered 
her with the help of his son); R v Kelley (1999), 135 CCC (3d) 449 
(ON CA), application for leave to appeal denied [2001] SCJ No 26 
(one of the motives for spousal murder thought to be collection of life 
insurance policy); R v Figueroa, 2008 ONCA 106 (appeal of 
conviction for the murder of accomplice’s wife where the 
accomplice/husband was suspected of arranging the murder in order 
to use deceased’s life insurance to pay off debts); R v Samuels, [2005] 
OJ No 1873 (CA), leave to appeal refused [2005] SCCA No 313 
(motive for murder of wife thought to be collection of life insurance 
policy, new trial ordered as a result of misleading jury instructions).   




hang over them. It is therefore important to give persons whose 
lives are insured the means to pre-empt concerns about the 
insured/beneficiary causing the insured loss, by removing the 
financial incentive for doing so.  
 
Insurable Interest and Non-Indemnity Insurance Contracts 
 
A court order is required to terminate or vary the terms of a 
non-indemnity insurance contract because of how the concept 
of insurable interest operates in relation to such contracts. Life, 
accident and sickness insurance are non-indemnity contracts. 
Unlike indemnity insurance contracts (for example, property 
insurance), recovery under non-indemnity insurance contracts 
is not dependent on proof of financial loss on the happening of 
the insured loss (for instance, the death of the person insured). 
Absence of the requirement for proof of financial loss gives 
rise to the possibility of personal insurance contracts being 
used as wagers, with a corresponding risk of moral hazard that 
a beneficiary may be interested in bringing about the insured 
loss, in this case, cause the death of the person whose life is 
insured for financial gain. To avoid this possibility, and to 
distinguish insurance contracts from wagers, the insured or 
policy owner is required to have an insurable interest in the 
person whose life is insured. Insurable interest ensures that the 
insured has a connection with the person whose life is insured 
such that they are interested in the latter’s continued existence 
and will suffer a detriment should harm befall that person, even 
if that loss cannot be estimated in monetary terms. The 
requirement of insurable interest is therefore intended to 
minimize the potential for moral hazard given the 
corresponding detriment to the insured should the insured loss 
materialize.11 A person has an insurable interest in their own 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 For a discussion of the evolution and critique of the insurable interest 
requirement, see Jacob Loshin, “Insurance Law’s Hapless Busybody: 
A Case against the Insurable Interest Requirement” (2007) 117 Yale 
LJ 474. 





life and in the lives of designated persons based on blood, 
affinity or pecuniary interests; these can include immediate 
family members (such as a child, grandchild, or spouse), 
employees, and others who consent to the purchaser of the 
policy insuring their lives.12 Such contracts do not provide that 
the insurer indemnify the insured for a pecuniary loss on the 
happening of an insured event. Rather, it is for the insurer to 
provide a predetermined amount when the insured risk 
materializes, for example death of the person whose life is 
insured.13 
 
Non-indemnity insurance contracts only require the 
existence of insurable interest at the inception of the contract. 
Subsequent loss of insurable interest during the lifetime of the 
person whose life is insured does not affect the validity of the 
insurance contract.14 As well, an insurable interest is not 
required at the time of loss. Thus, it is possible that a person 
could claim insurance money for the death of another person 
with whom they had never had a relationship: for example, 
where the former is an assignee of the benefits of the insurance 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  See BC Insurance Act, supra note 4, ss 45(2)(b), 46 (life) and ss 
107(2)(b), 108 (accident & sickness); Alberta Insurance Act, supra 
note 4, ss 646(2)(b), 647 (life) and ss 715(2)(b), 716 (accident & 
sickness); Manitoba Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 148(2) (life) and s 
203(2) (accident & sickness); Ontario Insurance Act, supra note 7, ss 
178(2)(b), 179 (life) and ss 305, 306(2)(b) (accident & sickness); 
Insurance Act, RSNS 1989, c 231, ss 79, 80(2)(b) (accident & 
sickness) and ss 180(2)(b), 181 (life). 
13  See Glynn  v Scottish Union and National Insurance Co. Ltd., [1963] 
2 OR 705 (CA). 
14  See Kosmopoulos v Constitution Insurance Company of Canada, 
[1987] 1 SCR 2; Chantiam, supra note 8. See also David Norwood 
and John P Weir, Norwood on Life Insurance Law in Canada, 3d ed 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at 85 [Norwood]. 




contract.15 A beneficiary can also make a claim upon the death 
of a person with whom they had ceased to have a relationship 
that supported an insurable interest and to whom they might in 
fact have been an adversary, competitor, etc. In Chantiam v 
Packall Packaging Inc., the Ontario Court of Appeal did not 
consider the latter situation to be contrary to public policy, 
reasoning that if it were, the legislature would have taken steps 
to address the situation. The Court noted:  
 
So long as the owner had an insurable interest at 
the commencement of the contract, the contract 
cannot subsequently be treated as though it were 
a wagering contract. While one can readily 
understand that the continuance of the insurance 
after the relationship giving rise to the insurable 
interest has ended may, as it is in this case, be 
offensive to the insured life, this is not a basis 
for nullifying or revoking an existing policy or 
for rendering it voidable at the request of the 
insured life. It must be assumed that the 
legislature has taken the public interest into 
account in not enacting provisions requiring that 
the termination of the insurable interest operates 
to cancel the contract… In the absence of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15  There are valid reasons for not requiring existence of insurable 
interest at the time of loss, including making it possible for the 
beneficiary to assign the benefits of life insurance contracts for 
security and other purposes. This is justified on the bases that such 
contracts are non-indemnity and also are investments and a form of 
property that can be traded like all other aspects of a person’s 
investment or savings portfolio. In fact, insurance legislation 
specifically gives beneficiaries of a life insurance policy the ability to 
assign their interest in the insurance money; see BC Insurance Act, 
supra note 4, s 66(1); Alberta Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 667(1); 
Ontario Insurance Act, supra note 7, s 200(3); Sun Life Assurance Co 
(Steadman) v Admin and Trust Co, [1933] 2 WWR 348 (Man KB); 
see also Norwood, ibid, at 359-360.    





legislation to this effect, the general principle 
that the subsequent termination of an insurable 
interest does not affect the rights of an owner-
beneficiary must prevail.16 
 
It is not uncommon for a person whose life is 
insured to feel uncomfortable about the continuation of 
the insurance policy when the relationship that 
supported the insurable interest at the outset of the 
contract ceases to exist, especially when there is 
hostility between the owner/beneficiary and the person 
whose life is insured.17 In such cases, the concern is 
that the owner/beneficiary may in fact be interested in 
the happening of the insured event so they may “cash 
in” on the insurance policy. This situation heightens 
concerns about moral hazards that could endanger the 
life and health of the person whose life is insured along 
with third parties. However, there are also situations in 
which continuation of a policy even upon relationship 
breakdown is an admitted advantage. For example, in 
the family law context, a life insurance policy may be a 
source of financial security for a spouse or child after 
the dissolution of a marital relationship. Courts have 
discretion to make orders for the continuation of life 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16  Chantiam, supra note 8 at para 18.  The amendment to the Ontario 
Insurance Act, s 179.1, that is yet come into force does not make life 
insurance contracts voidable upon the cessation of insurable interest. 
However, it will provide an opportunity for the person whose life is 
insured to seek an appropriate remedy when s/he reasonably believes 
her or his life or health is endangered by the existence of an insurance 
contract on her or his life. Such a provision would have given the 
plaintiff  in Chantiam the remedy that he sought after termination of 
the employment relationship and the plaintiff became a business 
competitor; termination or transfer of the policy to him at fair market 
value as the Court saw fit in the circumstances. 
17  See Hechter, supra note 8; Chantiam, ibid; Ralston, supra note 3. 




insurance policies as a means to ensure that child or 
spousal support continue after the death of a payor 
spouse/parent.18  
 
Termination of Insurance Policy: The Original Manitoba 
Provision  
 
In 1986, Manitoba became the first Canadian jurisdiction to 
amend its insurance legislation to give a person whose life is 
insured the opportunity to seek termination of an insurance 
contract on their life following termination of the relationship 
that gave rise to insurable interest that supported the insurance 
contract. When insurable interest no longer exists, an 
individual may obtain a court order to terminate the policy on 
her or his life. The provision states: 
 
A person whose life is insured may, where 
insurable interest no longer exists, apply to the 
court for an order requiring the insurer to 
immediately terminate the policy and pay over 
to the policy owner any value that exists in the 
policy.19 
 
The provision was prompted by recognition of the fact 
that some insureds might feel uneasy if another person with 
whom they no longer had a relationship held an insurance 
contract on their life. "In some circumstances, such as marriage 
breakdown or dissolution of a partnership, a person whose life 
is insured may become uncomfortable or find it offensive that 
an ex-spouse or an ex-partner continues to pay insurance 
premiums and to stand to personally gain by that individual's 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18  BC Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 170(e). 
19  Manitoba Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 155(4). Manitoba enacted a 
similar provision in relation to accident and sickness insurance in 
2012: Manitoba Insurance Act, ibid, s 217.1.  





death”.20 The provision was intended to remedy a fundamental 
problem with how the insurable interest requirement operates 
in relation to life insurance policies. Manitoba addressed this 
problem decisively; the power to terminate a life insurance 
policy is absolute if the person seeking termination can prove 
their life is insured under a policy and that the requisite 
insurable interest that supported the policy no longer exists. 
The applicant does not need to advance any other reason for 
seeking termination of the policy, and Manitoba courts do not 
have the discretion to decide whether termination in the 
circumstances is appropriate or not. For example, the court 
cannot probe a person whose life is insured to advance 
additional reasons such as stress or actual or potential danger to 
their life or well-being as further conditions for seeking 
termination. As the Manitoba Court of Appeal stated in 
Hechter v Sonya: 
 
Where an insurable interest ceases to exist, the 
person whose life is insured may apply to the 
court for an order terminating the policy. He/she 
must establish that his/her life is insured and an 
insurable interest no longer exists. The provision 
requires no other conditions to be established for 
the making of an order terminating the policy. It 
would be wrong for the court, by the exercise of 
judicial discretion, to add conditions to the 
application of s. 155(4) of the Act that the 
Legislature has not imposed. In our view, that 
would amount to unwarranted judicial 
legislation.21  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20  Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates 
(Hansard), 33rd Leg, 1st Sess, Vol 61 (6 August 1986) at 2654 
(Alvin Mackling). 
21  Hechther, supra note 8 at para 9. In Hechther, the parties entered into 
a partnership as practicing orthodontists and agreed that they would 
each insure the life of the other. When the partnership ended with the 




The provision is not completely inflexible, however. It 
recognizes that persons who are no longer in a relationship that 
provided an insurable interest may wish to continue existing 
policies to ensure mutual benefit and financial security in the 
event of accident, disability, sickness or death. In fact, it is not 
uncommon for the continuation of insurance to be one of the 
terms in separation or divorce agreements.22 There is therefore 
no assumption of a threat to the person whose life is insured 
upon cessation of an insurable interest to justify automatic 
termination of the insurance policy. This is why the provision 
gives the person whose life is insured the option of seeking 
termination of the policy upon cessation of insurable interest if 
he or she feels that is necessary in the circumstances, although 
there is no requirement to provide reasons for seeking 
termination beyond proof of loss of insurable interest.  Once 
such an application is made, the court is mandated to grant, and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
plaintiff’s retirement and in light of the acrimonious way in which 
that relationship ended, the plaintiff sought to sever all ties with the 
defendant including terminating the life insurance policy. The 
plaintiff terminated the policy on the defendant’s life but the latter 
refused to do the same. The defendant also declined the plaintiff’s 
subsequent request to assign the policy to him or terminate it, 
whereupon the plaintiff sought a remedy under s 155(4). The 
Manitoba Court of Appeal upheld termination of the policy, rejecting 
the defendant’s arguments that the motions judge erred in finding that 
the remedy of termination is mandatory and that the plaintiff had 
failed to establish valid reasons to justify the court making an order to 
terminate the policy. 
22  See Bond v Bond, 2012 ONSC 4374; Turner v DiDonato (2009), 95 
OR (3d) 147 (Ont CA); Dufresne v Dufresne, 2009 ONCA 682; 
Haber v Nicolle, 2011 BCSC 210; Stewart v Stewart Estate, 2011 
BCSC 774; Job v Job, 2009 BCSC 1806. These cases all involve 
situations wherein the continuation of life insurance, with the ex-
spouse or children as the named beneficiary/beneficiaries is included 
as an explicit term in the separation/divorce agreement. See also 
Keith B Farquhar, “Designated Insurance and Pension Beneficiaries 
and Unfulfilled Expectations” (1997) 14 Can J Fam L 63. 





only to grant, a termination order. No other remedy, such as 
variation of the terms, is possible under s 155(4) (and now s 
217.1) of the Manitoba legislation. While important in 
providing comfort to persons no longer in a relationship with 
the policy owner/beneficiary, these provisions do not provide a 
remedy so long as the relationship that provided insurable 
interest for the contract continues. Like Alberta and BC, 
Manitoba has now enacted provisions entitling persons whose 
lives and well being are insured to seek a judicial remedy for 
termination or variation even if the relationship giving rise to 
insurable interest continues to exist. Amendment to the Ontario 
Insurance Act introducing similar provisions is yet to come into 
force. 
 
Seeking a Judicial Remedy for Termination or Variation of 
Insurance Contracts  
 
Currently, persons whose lives are insured by others in British 
Columbia, Alberta and Manitoba may obtain a remedy where 
they reasonably believe that continued existence of the policy 
endangers their life or health. 23  Courts have discretion to grant 
the remedy that they see fit in the circumstances, and may 
include an order for the termination of the policy in accordance 
with the terms of the insurance contract or for a reduction in 
the insurance amount. While the provisions recognize the 
importance of protecting insured persons who fear for their 
lives or well-being, they also ensure due process for the 
insured, insurer and others with an interest in the insurance 
contract. The provisions strike a fair balance between the 
interests of the person whose life is insured and other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23  BC Insurance Act, supra note  4, s 47 (life), s 109 (accident and 
sickness); Alberta Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 648 (life), s 717 
(accident and sickness); Manitoba Insurance) Act,) supra) note! 4,! s!
155.1!(life)!and!s!217.2!(accident and sickness);)Ontario!Insurance 
Act, supra note 7, ss 179.1 (life), 306.1 (accident and sickness) (not 
yet in force). 




stakeholders by ensuring that they are aware that the person 
whose life is insured is seeking a remedy under those 
provisions. Generally, the insured, insurer and others with an 
interest in the insurance contract such as assignees must be 
given notice of the application.24 The legislation also 
recognizes that in some cases notifying some stakeholders, 
especially the insured/beneficiary, of the application for a 
remedy may actually endanger the health or life of the person 
whose life is insured. Courts have the discretion to waive the 
notice requirement to a person other than the insurer or insured 
for contracts of group insurance or creditor’s group insurance if 
it deems it just in the circumstances. For example, the person 
whose life is insured may convince the court that the danger is 
imminent and the notice period could be detrimental to their 
life or health as the beneficiary could act within that period or a 
notice might trigger the beneficiary to take the dreaded 
action.25 An order made under these provisions is binding on 
anyone with interest in the insurance contract.26 The discretion 
to waive the notice requirement is particularly useful where the 
need for a remedy stems from actual or potential acts of 




24  BC Insurance Act, ibid, s 47(3), s 109(3); Alberta Insurance Act, ibid, 
s 648(3), s 717(3); Manitoba Insurance) Act,) ibid,! ss! 155.1(3)! and!
217.2(3). 
25  BC Insurance Act, ibid, s 47(4), s 109(4); Alberta Insurance Act, ibid, 
s 648(4), s 717(4); Manitoba Insurance) Act,) ibid,! s! 155.1(4),! s!
217.2(4). The reference to insured in the context of group insurance 
is not to the individual insured/beneficiary but rather the owner or 
sponsor of the policy such as the beneficiary’s employer, trade union 
or professional association.  
26  BC Insurance Act, ibid, s 47(5), s 109(5); Alberta Insurance Act, ibid, 
s 648(5), s 717(5); Manitoba Insurance) Act,) ibid,! s! 155.1! (5),! s!
217.2(5). 





Cessation of insurable interest between the insured and 
the person whose life is insured is not a precondition for 
granting a remedy under these provisions.27 Thus, a person 
whose life is insured can obtain an order for termination of the 
insurance contract or variation of the insurance amount even 
when the relationship that supported insurable interest 
continues to exist. This allows for the protection of, for 
example, abused partners, estranged spouses, or children who 
may still be considered to be legally in a relationship with the 
owner/beneficiary that supported an insurable interest.  
 
Effectiveness of the Termination or Variation Provisions to 
Protect Persons Insured by Others 
 
The provisions giving courts discretion to terminate or vary 
terms of an insurance contract provide a broader basis for 
protecting persons whose lives and well being are insured 
compared to the termination only remedy upon cessation of 
insurable interest provisions; applicability of the former is not 
limited to situations where insurable interest ceases to exist. 
There may be good reason for a person, usually a woman, 
whose life is insured to seek termination or variation of the 
insurance policy, even before the termination of a relationship 
or loss of insurable interest, or variation such as reduction in 
the insurance amount after a relationship breakdown. The 
termination-only remedy upon cessation of insurable interest 
seems to be focused on situations of dissolution of partnerships 
or business relationships, breakdown of spousal relationships, 
or withdrawal of consent to insure a person outside the 
designated relationships giving rise to insurable interest. Yet, 
insurable interest exists in a broader range of relationships, 
often based on blood and kinship ties that are not severable, for 
example a parent-child relationship. As well, cessation of 
insurable interest may not be readily ascertainable in some 
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27  BC Insurance Act, ibid, s 47, s 109; Alberta Insurance Act, ibid, s 
648, s 717; Manitoba Insurance)Act,)ibid,!s!155.1,!s!217.2. 




situations such as where the owner/beneficiary is dependent on 
the person whose life is insured for support or otherwise has a 
pecuniary interest in the duration of their life.28 The broader 
provisions giving courts the discretion to grant appropriate 
remedies recognize that while the concern about moral hazard 
may arise in the business or spousal context, it can also arise in 
the other relationships giving rise to insurable interest. Thus, it 
is unduly restrictive to limit the option of seeking a remedy to 
situations of loss of insurable interest and for the only option to 
be termination of the insurance contract.  
 
As well, a termination-only option for judicial 
intervention appears to impose too great a constraint on courts 
and does not adequately recognize the range of concerns that 
persons whose lives are insured may have. Depending on the 
situation, a reduction in the insurance amount may be all that is 
required to protect the insured person or at least give them a 
sense of security. There may also be legitimate reasons to have 
the policy continue after cessation of insurable interest as 
insurance money can be included in the division of assets or 
used to support children and spouses after relationship 
breakdown. The broader termination or variation provisions 
recognize the variability of situations that may necessitate 
seeking a judicial remedy and the reality that termination of the 
insurance contract may not be warranted in every situation. 
That is why courts have the discretion to fashion a remedy that 
they consider to be just in the circumstances. 
 
This is not to say that the provisions giving courts 
discretion to grant an appropriate remedy without reference to 
cessation of insurable interest are without shortcomings. Like 
the termination-only remedy, the discretionary provisions raise 
some real concerns and questions about achieving the intended 
remedial purpose.  An obvious difficulty is that persons whose 
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28  See definition of insurable interest: BC Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 
46; Manitoba Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 156.  





lives are insured by others must be aware of the existence of 
the policy and must also know of the option of seeking a 
judicial remedy.  An insured may insure the life of a person in 
whom they have an insurable interest, usually a family 
member, or to increase the insurance amount without that 
person’s knowledge or consent.29 It is therefore possible that 
persons whose lives are insured may not be aware of the 
insurance contract on their lives or of an increase in the 
insurance amount in circumstances that could pose a threat to 
their life or health. Without that knowledge, a person whose 
life is insured may not be aware of the danger to her or him or 
the need to seek an order to eliminate or at least reduce the 
threat to her or his life. The potential for lack of knowledge is 
particularly great in the domestic context—the very context the 
provisions attempt to address—because family relationships 
give rise to insurable interests and the consent or knowledge of 
a family member is not required to obtain an insurance policy 
on her or his life. Therefore, it may well be that the provisions 
only benefit those who are aware of the insurance policy on 
their lives and have the opportunity to apply to court for a 
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29  Consent of the person whose life is to be insured is required only for 
those who do not fall within the relationships giving rise to an 
insurable interest. See BC Insurance Act, supra note 4, ss 45, 46, 107 
and 108. A person whose life is insured may be aware of the contract 
to be obtained or increase in the insurance amount where they are 
asked to answer questions about their health status or disclose 
relevant factors affecting insurability not disclosed by the insured 
pursuant to the disclosure obligation that is imposed on both the 
insured and the person whose life is insured. BC Insurance Act, ibid, 
s 51(1); s 111(1).   However, the need for such disclosure and hence 
awareness of the policy may not be necessary where the insured can 
confidently answer all the relevant questions or make the necessary 
disclosure regarding the person whose life is insured. As well, 
individualized assessment of insurability may not be required under 
some group plans. Thus, there is no guarantee the person whose life is 
insured will get to know of the existence of the policy and/or increase 
in the insurance amount. 




remedy when they reasonably believe their life or health may 
be endangered by it or upon cessation of insurable interest.   
 
These termination and variation provisions are more 
likely to be effective if the legislation also mandated that 
persons whose lives are insured must be made aware of the 
existence of such an insurance policy on their lives and/or 
increase in the insurance amount within a reasonable time after 
the policy is taken or any increase, for instance within 30 days, 
and given the option to seek a remedy as outlined in the 
insurance legislation. Such a requirement would be similar to 
the obligation on the part of insurers to notify a loss payee 
before cancelling an insurance contract,30 and to inform an 
insured about the existence of provisions in the contract that 
limit their rights of recovery, such as deductibles or co-
insurance clauses.31  In the meantime, to make the termination 
or variation provisions more effective, it should be a matter of 
best practice for insurers to notify persons whose lives are 
insured of the existence of such a contract and or increases in 
the insurance amount. It is also important for individuals who 
work with survivors of domestic violence to inquire about the 
existence of life insurance policies and to advise their clients to 
seek the appropriate remedy.32  
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30  BC Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 28; Alberta Insurance Act, supra 
note 4, s 539; Manitoba Insurance Act, supra note 4, s 136.3.  
31  BC Insurance Act, ibid, s 31; Alberta Insurance Act, ibid, s 543; 
Manitoba Insurance Act, ibid, s 136.6. 
32  This may not be an effective approach if the person whose life is 
insured is unaware of the existence of the policy. However, if they 
know an estranged partner has such a policy on their life, the inquiry 
may prompt them to also see the financial incentive as a possible 
reason to be concerned about their safety and seek an appropriate 
remedy. 





Cessation of insurable interest per se does not entitle a 
person whose life is insured to seek a remedy under the 
termination or variation provisions. It is only when they 
reasonably believe that their life or health may be endangered 
by the continuation of the insurance contract that they can seek 
a remedy. Thus, as previously mentioned, while the provisions 
recognize that the threat to a person’s life or health may arise 
even in the course of an ongoing relationship, it does not 
assume that a person’s health or life is endangered upon 
cessation of insurable interest. However, the provision does not 
indicate the necessary evidence and/or threshold for an 
applicant to prove reasonable belief that her or his life is in 
danger to warrant termination or variation of a policy. This 
might allow courts to exercise greater discretion in determining 
when and what remedy is warranted in particular 
circumstances. However, until there is established case law 
from higher courts giving guidance for assessing such 
applications, there may be concern about what trial courts 
would consider appropriate evidence to justify making an 
order.  
 
There may also be a concern that individuals who feel 
their health or life may be endangered by the continuation of an 
insurance contract may not be able to provide the requisite 
proof and could be denied a remedy. Given the potential for 
volatility in the domestic context, it may be relatively easy for 
ex-partners or spouses or those in the process of separating and 
seeking divorce to establish threat to their life or health as a 
reason for seeking a court order for termination or variation of 
the terms of an insurance contract on their life. In fact, such an 
order may be sought as part of separation or divorce 
proceedings or even pending the termination of the 
relationship, or where a party obtains a protection order as an 
at-risk family member or a victim of family violence in the 
family law context. However, the need for a remedy may be 
less clear where the person whose life is insured continues to 
have contact or some relationship with the insured, which is not 




uncommon in the spousal context. For instance, a woman may 
not easily leave an abusive relationship because of financial 
dependence on her partner or threats of violence if she dares to 
leave. As well, ex-partners may continue to have contact with 
each other because of shared parenting responsibilities. Thus, a 
more nuanced consideration of the applicant’s situation is 
required in such cases to determine the appropriate remedy in 
the circumstances.33  
!
Establishing the Basis for a Remedy: Lessons from the 
Family Law Context 
 
There are similarities in the remedial purposes of the 
termination or variation provisions under the Insurance Act and 
protection orders in the family law context;34 in particular, both 
regimes seek to protect vulnerable family members. 
Comparisons can also be drawn with a recognizance or “peace 
bond” under s. 810 of the Criminal Code.35 It is therefore 
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33  There may be a number of reasons – social, economic, cultural – why 
a person who feels her or his life or health may be endangered by the 
continuation of a life insurance policy on her or his life may not 
terminate a relationship with the policy owner/beneficiary, or at least 
not at that time. 
34  Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 183; Protection Against Family 
Violence Act, RSA 2000, c P-27, s 4. 
35  According to the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 810(1), an 
information for a recognizance “may be laid before a justice by or on 
behalf of any person who fears on reasonable grounds that another 
person will cause personal injury to him or her or to his or her spouse 
or common-law partner or child or will damage his or her property”. 
If the requirement for reasonable grounds is met, the individual in 
question may be required to enter into a “peace bond” for a period of 
up to twelve months prohibiting them from coming within a certain 
distance of a place or communicating with the person for whom the 
information was laid; see s 810(3) and (3.2). The past actions of the 
defendant can be used to help determine if the informant’s fear rests 





reasonable to expect that courts are likely to assess similar 
factors when considering termination or variation of insurance 
policies as they do in making protection/restraining orders in 
the family context.  A court may make a protection order under 
the BC Family Law Act when it determines that a person is an 
"at-risk family member" because she or he has been subjected 
to family violence or because such violence is likely to occur. 
An "at-risk family member" is defined as “a person whose 
safety and security is or is likely at risk from family violence 
carried out by a family member”.36 Similarly, courts in Alberta 
may issue protection orders if an applicant or a person on 
whose behalf the order is sought has been a victim of family 
violence,37 which includes “any act or threatened act that 
intimidates a family member by creating a reasonable fear of 
property damage or injury to a family member”.38 Relevant 
factors for determining whether a court should issue a 
protection order under the BC Family Law Act include history, 
frequency and recentness of psychological, emotional or 
physical violence. Courts will also consider whether there has 
been deliberate damage to property, the current status of the 
relationship between the parties including recent separations or 
intent to separate, and the claimant’s perception of risks to her 
or his safety and security.39 In Dawson v Dawson,40 the 
claimant sought a protection order after her ex-husband served 
a prison sentence for what was “described as a serious, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
on reasonable grounds; see R v Patrick (1990), 75 CR (3d) 222 (BC 
Co Ct).  
36  BC Family Law Act, supra note 34, s 182. 
37  Alberta Protection Against Family Violence Act, supra note 34, ss 4, 
6. 
38  Ibid, s 1(1)(e)(ii). 
39  BC Family law Act, supra note 34, s 184(1). See Morgadinho v 
Morgadinho, 2014 BCSC 192 [Morgadinho]. 
40  2014 BCSC 44, aff’d: 2014 BCCA 44 [Dawson]. 




unprovoked, and disturbing incident...a brutal attack on a 
defenceless victim”, that resulted in serious bodily injuries.41 In 
holding that the claimant was an at-risk family member, 
justifying a protection order, Barrow J noted that while 
evidence of repetitive acts of violence would often indicate the 
likelihood of family violence recurring in the future, warranting 
a protection order, the justification for such an order could 
equally be founded on a single serious act of family violence, 
as was in this case.  
 
The passage of time may reduce the probative value of 
previous acts of violence, especially in relation to a single act 
of violence. However, if the circumstances that gave rise to the 
earlier act(s) of violence remain unresolved, then the court is 
more likely to be wary of family violence recurring in the 
future.42 In addition, the nature and gravity of harm that might 
ensue from an act of violence is relevant in determining 
whether the claimant is at risk of future violence. The court in 
Dawson preferred to adopt a preventative approach to the 
determination of whether family violence was likely to recur in 
the future. Barrow J stated:  
 
Given the protective purpose of orders under 
Part 9 of the Family Law Act, it is reasonable in 
my view to apply what might be termed a sliding 
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41  Dawson, ibid at para 9. 
42  Ibid, at para 44. The court concluded that the assault on the plaintiff 
was due in part to the defendant’s mental illness, which remained 
unresolved: ibid, at para 44. Similarly, in Morgadinho, supra note 39, 
where the parties had separated by the time of the action, the court 
refused to characterize the previous acts of violence as escalating or 
repetitive, and there was no likelihood of increase in the risk to the 
claimant. Yet, the court concluded that the continuing dysfunctional 
nature of the relationship between the parties was likely to provoke 
threats of violence against the claimant, endangering her safety and 
security, which justified making a protection order. 





scale to the threshold. The potential for very 
serious acts of violence is sufficient to engage 
the provisions of the Act, even if those acts of 
violence are, in absolute terms, not particularly 
likely.43  
 
Prior abusive behaviour will not always justify making 
a protection order, especially where parties have had limited 
contact since separation and where that situation is unlikely to 
change in the future, or where the court is confident that the 
defendant is unlikely to engage in future acts of violence, 
thereby making the recurrence of violence against the applicant 
unlikely.44 As well, acts or threats of violence arising from 
feelings of anger, animosity, betrayal, etc., during and 
immediately following a relationship breakdown may diminish 
over time, and thereby obviate the potential for violence 
justifying a court making a protection order.45 While such a 
position is intended to prevent the making of unnecessary 
protection orders, courts should not lose sight of the remedial 
purpose of the provision and should be cautious about refusing 
to grant protection orders when the underlying trigger for 
previous abusive conduct remains at large, even if future 
contact between the parties is likely to be limited.  
 
Similarly, an applicant’s subjective fear for her or his 
safety will not justify making a protection order unless those 
fears are objectively reasonable to justify such a limitation on 
the respondent. The requirement of objective justification of an 
applicant’s fear for her or his safety is intended to balance the 
parties’ competing interests and prevent abuse of the court’s 
powers by applicants who may have ulterior motives for 
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43  Dawson, supra note 40 at para 45. 
44  See Cabezas v Maxim, 2014 BCSC 767; NCR v KDC, 2014 BCPC 9 
at paras 117-118. 
45  See Andres v Andres, 2009 ABQB 26 at para 42 [Andres]. 




seeking such an order.46 However, courts need to be attentive to 
the complicated and subtle ways in which victimization may 
occur and the reasons why a person may reasonably feel her or 
his life or health may be endangered even without seemingly 
corroborative evidence. This is particularly important in 
situations where there have been threats of violence that may 
be escalating but not yet resulted in physical acts of violence. 
In Fuda v Fuda,47 the court cautioned against the tendency to 
discount an applicant’s subjective fears for her safety arising 
from potential acts of violence, noting that the focus should 
rather be on whether those fears are legitimate. Specifically, the 
court noted that an application for a protection order should not 
be denied even where the applicant’s fear for her or his safety 
is somewhat subjective provided there are compelling facts 
justifying those fears.48   
 
Although there are similarities in the purposes of the 
termination or variation provisions under the insurance 
legislation and protection orders in the family law context, and 
courts are likely to assess similar factors in determining the 
appropriateness of a remedy under both regimes, the threshold 
for a remedy need not be the same. Obtaining a variation or 
termination remedy in the insurance context should not depend 
on whether a person can establish the basis for a threat on a 
balance of probabilities, but instead, whether there is a 
reasonable chance of the risk materializing. Courts need to be 
attentive to the insured person’s subjective assessment that her 
or his life may be endangered because of the existence of a life 
insurance contract on her or his life and/or the insurance 
amount. However, there must be some reasonable basis for the 
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46  See Andres, ibid, at para 40; RP v RP, 2012 ABQB 353 at paras 29-
33. 
47  Fuda v Fuda, 2011 ONSC 154. 
48  Ibid at paras 31-32. See also Khara v McManus, 2007 ONCJ 223 
[Khara]. 





insured person’s concerns about their life and safety, for 
instance, based on the respondent’s conduct. Care must be 
taken not to insist on a high threshold that may make it difficult 
for applicants to justify the need for a remedy in particular 
circumstances. Dunn J’s statement in Khara in relation to an 
application for a restraining order is equally instructive in this 
regard; he stated that while the applicant’s perception of fear of 
harassment need not “be understood by everyone…an 
applicant’s fear of harassment must not be entirely subjective, 
comprehended only by the applicant”.49 While past threats or 
acts of violence and abuse should generally support an 
application for a remedy, a court should be equally open to 
granting an appropriate order even if there is no history of 
abuse, provided that the evidence suggests a possibility of 
violence given the parties’ current situation. 
   
CONCLUSION 
 
The current insurance regimes in BC, Alberta, and Manitoba, 
have taken critical steps in recognizing the need for greater 
protection for those whose lives are insured by others.  Ontario 
is moving in a similar direction with an amendment to its 
insurance act that is yet to come into force. By allowing 
persons whose lives are insured to apply to the court for 
termination or variation of an insurance policy, more lives may 
be protected. As well, more transparency and discussion on 
how to better address these situations may be encouraged. This 
is particularly positive for women and children who are 
predominantly the victims of domestic violence. It is hoped 
that other jurisdictions will also seriously consider similar 
amendments to their insurance legislation.  While concerns 
may remain about the consequences of imposing a burden of 
proof on persons whose lives are insured by others to 
adequately articulate threats to their life or health, one might 
argue that it is good public policy. It may be a way to balance 
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49  Khara, ibid at para 33. 




the competing interests of the insured/beneficiary and the 
person whose life is insured to better protect the public and in 
particular victims or potential victims of domestic violence. !
